The figure of 13 per cent access to a car is a tricky one, isn't it, because, on the surface, that seems like a good thing. It's relatively low that people are not denied the freedom of movement a car provides, but, actually, the reverse is true. The fact that only 13 per cent of people are without a car means the rest are forcing themselves to be able to afford a car in order to access key services, whereas if they had a real choice, a good public transport system that was easy to use and was affordable, we could afford for that figure to be a lot higher. So, I think we should just be aware of that, that relatively few having no access to a car is not a good thing from a social justice point of view, and giving people a real choice of modes so that they don't feel that they have to buy a car they would struggle to afford would be a better position to be in.
And then that goes to the choices that we have before us. Our long-term and medium-term direction is very clear—we have to achieve modal shift in order to meet our climate targets. That means 10 per cent fewer car journeys and far more public transport journeys. But, in order to get there, we obviously have to recalibrate the way that we spend our money, and that's what the roads review was about. It was about freeing up money both for road maintenance and also for public transport. But, in the short term, given the twin problems of farebox revenue falling because of COVID and passenger behaviour and rising cost inflation, we are in a tight spot with the choices we make. As we've already rehearsed, we've taken the decision to preserve investment in the railway because we know that, in time, that will help us to get to our modal shift targets in urban areas, because that will deliver significant extra public transport use. But, in the short term, it does mean us having to constrain the amount of money that we've got available to spend on buses, which, from a social justice point of view, are a far better investment.
Now, because we've got a fragmented, commercialised, privatised bus system, we don't have the strategic levers to control bus in the way that we will once we have franchising. So, it's a variable that is very hard to deal with. Even if we were to pour a pile of extra revenue funding, which we don't have, into buses, because the system is so inefficient, we wouldn't get a very strong return for that. That's why we need to plug the leaks and go for a franchise planned system. In practice, we are facing a trade-off, and—this is true of transport policy across the UK, by the way—we are preserving rail services that generally benefit more middle-class people, and we are not expanding the bus service, which benefits people on lower incomes and people who have transport poverty, through disabilities or young people who don't have the ability to drive. I think there's a profound and fundamental structural problem across the UK in which we treat rail versus bus. The truth is we need both, and that's why, from TfW, we are creating this idea of a guiding mind system where we'll be able to have a properly integrated transport system where we can plan bus and rail to join up. At the moment, we can't do that. If a bus operator wants to run a service that runs in with a train timetable, it can. But if they don't want to, we can’t force them to, and that means there is a disconnect from a passenger point of view for using. So, we want to get to a point where both rail and bus complement each other, work in tandem. That does mean, in the short term, putting that money into rail to get that system there. It also means, in the short term, planning to get a planned franchise bus network, but, in the meantime, there is a gap, and I would much—. If I had completely free rein, Jenny, I would much rather put extra money into bus and active travel than rail, from a social justice point of view, but the system is not designed like that, and that is why we are redesigning the system.