Public Accounts and Public Administration Committee

We have a number of papers to note, the first being a supplementary response from the Welsh Government to our report on public appointments, which we've published, plus our supplementary report on 27 March last year. The Welsh Government laid its response to these reports last 9 June and it was considered at the committee's meeting last 18 June. So, we've received now an additional response from the Welsh Government updating us on progress and building on the information provided in its June response, now providing an update on the issues of interest to this committee. These issues will be considered further by us during the Welsh Government accounts scrutiny session that will take place with the chief operating officer and the Permanent Secretary on 12 February, but, Members, do you have any comments or you content to note the response?

Content to note.

Thank you. In which case, we move on to our second paper to note, a response from the Welsh Government regarding the ministerial code. Members may recall that the FDA, which is the senior civil service union, wrote to the committee on 10 November last year with observations relating to our work on Cabinet manuals and the ministerial code. This letter was noted at our meeting on 27 November, and a letter raising these points was issued to the First Minister last month, on 3 December. The First Minister responded on 5 January. Her letter states that:

'When I reached the conclusion that it was time for us to have in Wales an Independent Advisor on Ministerial Standards, I did consider carefully whether it would be appropriate to give them powers to conduct investigations on their own initiative but—as the FDA have pointed out—decided not to do so.'

The First Minister concluded,

'I recognise, that as the role of the Independent Advisor beds in and becomes more developed in Wales that this issue might be revisited in the future. But at this stage of development, I do not think that what the FDA are urging me to do is appropriate.'

So, Members, do you have any comments on this, or do you wish to note the response?

I move we note it.

I'm content to note, Chair.

Adam, any comments?

Well, it's not unexpected, is it? It was on the record already.

Right. Could I suggest that this is included in the legacy report, with reference to the concluding statement that this might be revisited in the future, for successive committees to capture in their routine investigations and scrutiny? Thank you.

Our third paper to note is a letter received from Public Health Wales regarding the committee's sixth Senedd legacy report. Their chief executive has written to us to share their public health priorities to inform said report. We will our consider our legacy issues later this term, alongside our scrutiny of the Welsh Government's accounts. Again, Members, do you have any comments, or are you content to note?

I'll start again—content to note.

That's very kind, thank you. No-one else is commenting, so I'll assume that's unanimous.

And our fourth paper to note was received from the Chief Executive and Clerk of the Senedd, Manon Antoniazzi, to myself, regarding decisions taken relating to the Commission's budgeting and financial management. She wrote to us on 10 December to inform us that the Commission has recently received confirmation that an appeal undertaken on their behalf by property advisers regarding the rateable value of the Cardiff Bay estate has been successful. In consequence, the Commission is entitled to a refund of moneys paid, backdated to the 2017-18 financial year. The refund amounts to £3.221 million, plus interest at £0.291 million—£291,000—plus a reduction on the current year charges of £0.091 million, coming to a total of £3.603 million. I won't be testing you on all those figures.

The letter further states that the Commission agreed at its meeting on 4 December to retain £644,000, which is approximately 20 per cent of the total, excluding interest, to undertake building works necessary at—I'm in a mess; excuse me a moment—the Senedd, in the Senedd building and estate, and return the remainder to the Welsh consolidated fund. The letter also confirms that this information has been provided to the Finance Committee. Members, any comments, or are you content to note?

Content to note.

Thank you.

Thought I'd save you a job. [Laughter.]

You're a great spokesperson for Mr Hedges. Thank you. [Laughter.] In which case, we can break for five minutes. If we can reconvene at 9.30 a.m., please.

Bore da. Croeso. Good morning and welcome. We return to this morning's session of the Public Accounts and Public Administration Committee here in the Senedd. I welcome our witnesses, the First Minister, Eluned Morgan, and her team. Now, this is our sixth and final session as part of our consideration of the UK COVID-19 inquiry module 1 report. So, again, welcome to our witnesses. I'd be grateful if you could identify your names and roles for the record.

I'm Eluned Morgan, First Minister of Wales.

Bore da. Andy Fraser, chief officer, national security and resilience.

Bore da. Sioned Rees, director of public health protection.

Bore da. Alyson Francis, director, COVID-19 inquiry.

Diolch. Thanks, everybody, for that. Just a reminder that the meeting is bilingual and headsets provide simultaneous translation on channel 1 and sound amplification on channel 2. We have a number of questions we hope to get through with you. I'd ask both Members and witnesses to be as succinct as possible to enable us to cover as many of those as possible. And, as convention has it, I will begin, as Chair, those questions.

In your response to the UK COVID-19 inquiry module 1 report, the Welsh Government committed to strengthening Wales's resilience and preparedness through updates to the Wales resilience framework, informed by the civil contingency review and reforms to the Welsh health protection system. So, can you tell us what tangible progress has been made so far on those commitments, and how are you ensuring that the changes deliver measurable improvements in Wales's resilience and preparedness?

Thank you very much, and thank you for the opportunity to come and speak to you today.

I think it's important to set out before we start this committee the fact that the Welsh Government wants to express our deepest sympathy to those people who suffered during COVID-19. It was an extremely difficult time for the whole nation, but in particular for those people who lost loved ones. Everybody was impacted in one way or the other, and there are people still suffering today the consequences of COVID-19, and, of course, it is still with us in our communities. I want to take this opportunity to thank NHS workers, front-line workers, who were there, keeping the nation going during the pandemic.

As a Government, we had to face some extremely difficult decisions. You will be aware that the inquiry recognised the inclusive and transparent decision-making process that we had within the Welsh Government, but we are absolutely determined to learn lessons as a result of COVID. What can we do differently next time? What can we learn? It's important that we learn lessons from the inquiry—that's what you are asking in relation to module 1. What have we learned? What was the contingency planning? Clearly, we have not waited for that inquiry to publish. Even before they gave their response to module 1, we were on it. We had already started on a comprehensive change in relation to making sure we had that resilience framework that was being developed. That has now been published. And we have, of course, in our response to module 1, outlined the progress that has already been made in relation to the Wales resilience framework. I think we've made substantial progress. We've enhanced our governance arrangements, we've changed our crisis management structures, our evidence base and our partnership working. There's a really strengthened relationship in relation to the local resilience forum partnerships.

And, of course, we have, alongside the resilience framework, a delivery plan, and that is the important bit. You create the framework, but what is actually going to change? What's going to happen? It's set out very clearly what we expect them to do. People are held to account. We have this reformed pan-Wales governance arrangement. I think I've sent around a—. In fact, I'll send around a sense of what the structure looks like. We do have the Wales resilience forum, and then the Wales resilience partnership sits underneath that, and the operational sub-groups underneath that. I chair an annual summit of the Wales resilience forum, and we get everybody in a room. They meet three times a year, four times a year. I chair one of those meetings, where we have a really comprehensive analysis of, 'Right, this is what we set out we wanted to do. Are we on course to deliver that? How does that work?' So, I think we've come a very long way. Andy, is there anything you'd like to add to that?

Diolch, Prif Weinidog. Just to add some particular points in relation to the tangible specifics and improvements in relation to the framework to which the First Minister responded, I think one of the major aspects—and my team is working flat out on this agenda—is we have published, for the first time, a Wales bespoke risk register in relation to civil contingencies, setting out over 100 significant risks facing Wales, amongst what is an evolving risk landscape. Alongside that, we have produced a preparedness report, which is a unique product in the UK, which sets out how the local resilience forums in Wales are prepared against those specific risks. What I would like to say in relation to that is that the framework, the delivery plan and the risk register have been produced in close partnership with the responder community. This is not something we've just produced in-house within the Welsh Government. We've worked very closely with dozens of responder agencies amongst the local resilience forums, and also consulting partners across the UK, including the UK Government and other devolved Governments.

We've also put in place for the first time substantial core funding to support multi-agency working at the LRF, and that's taken place since the COVID pandemic. We've also introduced new crisis management structures, resilience overwatch functions, so that when we do spot specific risks emerging and increasing, we can tackle that through a spotlight approach to assessing that risk. At the heart of some of these products are independent input. We're really keen to make sure that we've got independent scrutiny, objective assessment on the major products that we're producing, and that's going to continue.

The final couple of points, just to add, First Minister and Chair, we've introduced new exercising and training for the local responder community, to lock in the lessons from not only the pandemic, but also dozens of other incidents to which we've responded, and, alongside that, introduced a new lessons management system, so that, going forward, we can meet that commitment in relation to continuous improvement and locking in the learning as we face new incidents in future. Diolch.

Can I just bring in Rhianon Passmore, please?

Bearing in mind—and this isn't in my line of questioning, Chair; I don't see it anyway—the disproportionate impact on our black and ethnic minority communities and that historical lack of data, and I'm not going to stray into that, but how are we actually moving to identify those gaps in information within our communities across Wales?

We've got a very comprehensive 'Anti-racist Wales Action Plan', and part of that is collection of data. So, we've got workforce data now being collected across health and social care. What we're trying to do is to make sure that we collate that information, we share it, we use it transparently. In the workforce race equality standard, which comes under the 'Anti-racist Wales Action Plan', there is a data tool where you can really input people's lived experience. So, I think we are very clear that there was a disproportionate impact. We tried to mitigate that during the pandemic, but we're trying to be more proactive in making sure that we get ahead of that in any future situation.

Okay. Thank you.

Thank you. We'd better move on. There are lots more questions to get through. So, in our evidence, we heard that national responders find it challenging to service four separate local resilience forums and dozens of sub-groups when all four forums are activated simultaneously. What steps, therefore, is the Welsh Government taking, if any, to co-ordinate these structures so that national responders can engage with multiple local resilience forums more efficiently?

So, we recognise that, actually, when you have this kind of situation, a crisis situation that involves the entire nation, this is going to get quite complicated and a lot of people are going to be involved. So, that's why it makes sense for us to try and localise things, because there may be different responses that you need in different places. But, at the same time, what you don't want to do is to duplicate. So, we start off with a 'once for Wales' approach—this is what we think is a good model that people should be doing. We have the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. That places a statutory responsibility on the category 1 responders—that's the blue-light people—to work together on preparedness and response. Clearly, there is a cohesion within those groups already; they have national standards that they work to.

But, you're quite right that, when it comes to local resilience forums, in order to provide that more local response, we may need to get a bit deeper. What we've done is we helped to provide funding to make sure that we can support that. So, there's a new work programme, and that includes areas where these partners support each other, and they get support from the Welsh Government. The idea is you optimise efficiency in that way. Is there anything to add, Andy?

Just to add, First Minister, that I think, both in terms of optimising efficiency and that 'once for Wales' principle to which you referred, they're core principles in the framework. I think that was borne out in the partnership approach that we took to developing that strategy. So, that's going to underpin all the work we do. The whole focus of that is to make sure that we're removing the risk of duplication and repetition. We do things once for Wales; we don't do them across the four individual local resilience forums. They're done once, consistently, which should help, I think, mitigate that demand on those national bodies from which your committee has heard previously. Diolch.

Speaking for those blue-light responders, Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service highlighted the need for what they termed 'better battle rhythm' regarding the timing of strategic and tactical consultation groups. So, how will you ensure that scheduling for strategic and tactical co-ordination groups accounts for the limited capacity of responders covering wide areas?

I think that's a really interesting question. I bumped into people in Dolgellau recently at the fire service. It was just fascinating talking to them, because a lot of them are retained firefighters. There's a very different response in different areas. Their capacity is different. So, we do have to take that on board. That's why I think this was an issue that was discussed in the last meeting. Isn't that right, Andy?

Absolutely. I think the first thing to say on this matter, Chair, is, on strategic and tactical co-ordination groups within each of the four LRF regions in Wales, that is actually a matter for the responders themselves. There are some occasions where there is an incident, a major emergency, affecting one of those regions, and they have the autonomy to stand up their arrangements when they need to. We've got to be a little bit careful in terms of the Welsh Government's support for that, that we don't fetter their discretion, their statutory roles.

When it comes to incidents and major emergencies across more than one of those regions, our clear advice to those local multi-agency responders is to try and choreograph their co-ordination group meetings, whether it's strategic or tactical, so that we've got clear differentiation, and we, the Welsh Government, can support those. So, we actually advise them to make sure that they're choreographed to de-conflict when those meetings are taking place. Then, on top of that, we provide support and representations at each of those meetings so that we can make sure that we're picking up intelligence information, and so that we can advise Ministers accordingly and provide support where that's necessary.

Rhianon Passmore has a question.

On that particular point, in terms of that not wanting to fetter, when you're dealing with—. For instance, none of us would like to see a pandemic, a terrorist attack or anything occurring simultaneously across Wales, but that has to be planned for. So, is that enough in terms of Welsh Government's handle on that?

I think there is still some way to go. I think our experience over the last 12, 18 months, we've seen a number of real-world incidents—storms that have had significant implications for communities and the economy, flooding events where we've had the activation of these groups across different regions. I think there's some way to go here. A lot of this depends on the scale of the emergency and how widespread the impacts are. I would say that it works, in the main. We've also tested some of this in Exercise Pegasus, where, of course, all these regions activated their procedures as well. We had some of the same challenges there. So, I think there's some way to go here. I think we can provide perhaps a bit more clarity through guidance in future, pending Ministers' views, but I think it's generally working, but I think it can be improved. I would accept that.

Okay, thanks.

Okay, thank you. With reference to the module 1 recommendations on simplifying structures and strengthening preparedness, witnesses told us that the role of emergency co-ordination centre Wales remains unclear, and that it has not been activated since the pandemic. What therefore is your timeline for clarifying their remit, and ensuring that they're fully equipped and prepared to operate effectively in future emergencies?

I think there's probably a misunderstanding of what the emergency co-ordination centre is. It is a location; it's not a programme. This is in CP2 in Cathays Park. The point of this is that it provides a facility to allow co-location if you are in a particularly difficult situation. It's a Government secure facility, and if strategic decisions need to be made quickly, that is where people would congregate. I think realistically, actually, we're living in a different world now. What would happen is that a lot of this would be done remotely. You've just got to crack on, people across the country, but if you did need to get everybody together, there is a facility for that.

I think it's probably worth pointing out, first of all, that we have a crisis management concept of operations. What that actually means—I'll translate these big titles that are very grand—is it looks at in what circumstances structures are activated and need to be stepped up. So, on what occasions do you actually say, 'Right, actually, you do need to kick in to the response mechanism'? It's worth stating that, last year, that crisis operation was stood up 31 times during the year. That's not an insignificant number.

Just to give you some examples, we had that burst water main in north Wales that you'll be aware of, Chair. We had the Clydach Dingle wildfire, we had storm Claudia—several storms, in fact. So, these things are happening on a fairly frequent basis. Anything to add there?

[Inaudible.]—was it 13?

Thirty-one.

Thirty-one times. Was that the centre itself, or something less than the full centre kicking in too?

The centre is a location, but the operation was stepped up 31 times.

So, that was the EECW operation—the emergency co-ordination centre Wales operation.

Well, no, it's a place; it's not a thing.

Yes. But as you indicated, it co-ordinates an integrated role for relevant agencies when there's a—.

That's a slightly different thing. Andy, can you—?

If I can help clarify, Chair. The crisis management machinery of Government is there and kicks in according to the level of emergency and demand that's required. We work according to JESIP principles, the joint emergency services interoperability programme. That is the standard practice employed by the emergency services to respond to crises and co-ordinate decision making. We operate on those same principles. One of those principles is co-location.

In our structures, a decision is taken when we activate our structures whether physical co-location is needed, which would take place within the emergency co-ordination centre, or whether the crisis can be managed online in a virtual sense. It is now accepted as good practice that, when these issues arise, it may be more efficient and more effective to convene partners online through virtual online meetings to co-ordinate and share information. That is accepted standard practice. However, there may be occasions where you need to physically locate across Government and with partners, such as in the ECCW, to co-ordinate that situation.

I'll give you one example. With the two major water outages in north Wales last year, it wouldn't be sensible to ask emergency service leaders to travel five or six hours to Cardiff to convene within ECCW. Instead, we convened our crisis management machinery online. I'd also say that ECCW is in constant use. As the First Minister said, it's a secure Government command and control centre. It's used for committee sessions, for briefing senior officials and Ministers, as a crisis management training hub, for Government communications with partners across the UK. So, I don't think we would recognise that it's not being activated. The centre is in active and constant use.

Finally, I'd just say in terms of the resilience framework delivery plan, we've actually said that we do need to modernise some elements of the centre, and we've captured that in there, but it is effectively an operational centre at the moment.

Adam Price has a question.

Good morning. Have you modelled situations where—? As far as online communication is concerned, what if there was a technical problem relating to, for example, hybrid tools and so on, and if there was a cyber attack that meant that all of the technology relating to that had stopped working? Could you tell us a little bit about that kind of scenario?

That's part of the risk management. We've made it clear that there is a very comprehensive list in terms of risk management, and cyber attacks are obviously a part of that. That's why it's important not only to have a situation where you can gather online, but that you have a place where you can come together. Andy.

I think, in terms of that question, that's a really good example of where physical co-location would be important, because that might be the only means you have to communicate and co-ordinate information together in one facility. It does provide real challenges if the impacts of, for example, a power outage or, indeed, a cyber attack mean that we lose our telecommunication systems. There are real fundamental challenges, and I don't think we can pretend that that wouldn't be an issue. So, that's why we try to provide versatility in our structures, to be able to co-locate physically or online, and that provides us with some resilience. But again, I think, given the nature of the risks Wales is facing in future, we need to do more to expand that capability to ensure that we've got stronger resilience in that space.

And just in that scenario, without going into too much detail perhaps, for understandable reasons, is part of that contingency planning ensuring that there are alternative systems and approaches? That is, if system A were to fail, for example, you would have something else that could then provide some kind of digital communication.

Yes, there are limited details I can disclose in this forum, but there are some redundancy arrangements in place and resilience systems that we can draw upon in those types of situation.

I presume that goes beyond morse code and beacons on the hills. [Laughter.]

I think it's worth actually bearing in mind that, pre pandemic, none of us were meeting online in the way that we do today. So, part of what we have to do is to be constantly updating the mechanisms and systems to respond to the technological advances, to changes, and to recognise that, yes, now we all take it for granted that you can all link up online, but it also brings up a challenge as well. So, you've just got to take the good and the bad at the same time. That's why this risk register is so important, because all of that—. You don't just set out the risks, but you obviously then have to set out what you do about those risks, what measures are in place, and, of course, there are plans in place to make sure that there are contingencies for those situations. I just think it's worth remembering that none of us worked online the way we do today pre pandemic. It was a revolution that happened at the same time.

There were non-digital alternatives there, some of which have now disappeared. I digress a little, but a couple of weeks ago, there was an outage at Connah's Quay BT station, which meant my home and many others in the area not only couldn't access Wi-Fi, but couldn't use their landline phones. And in that scenario, at a national level, there might be concerns over how the decisions you make are then communicated. Tom Giffard.

Diolch, Cadeirydd. I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about governance and accountability. First Minister, in your written evidence, you stated that feedback from the responder community indicates the revised structures have been agile and effective during recent incidents. However, we heard concerns from COVID-19 Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru about the lack of publicly available evidence to substantiate that claim. Aside from internal feedback, what evidence do you have that can demonstrate that these revised structures are delivering measurable improvements? How do you measure agility and effectiveness, and is there a metric that we can refer to to judge that?

So, I think the assessment of our crisis management structures is demonstrated by, more than anything, how we respond now to incidents and what support we give to those multi-agency responses. It can be proved in real time. The fact that we have seen that in action 31 times this year—you'll be aware of some of it, but the fact that—. That's quite a high number, and the fact that you probably haven't clocked that many, I hope demonstrates that actually the system is working reasonably well.

But there's a difference, isn't there, between the amount of use and how effective it is? Do you accept that?

I do accept that, but you're asking for proof, and I'm telling you that 31 times—. You probably clocked it on a few occasions, on the really big storms and things, but, actually, a huge amount of this work is being done under the radar, quietly. It did get to a point where that concept of operations level was met, where they said, 'You've got to kick in, we pull everyone together', but actually we just got on with it and it was just delivered quietly.

We're constantly learning, and that's really, really important. After every event, there is a system where we just wrap up and ask, 'What did we learn from that?' I was very aware—. During the two major storms last year, we sat down afterwards and asked, 'Right, what can we do better? How do we learn from this?' And you could see, by the second storm, all of that learning had kicked in, and that constant learning is really important. It's constantly being stress tested in the real world by mother nature doing her stuff.

I think you've got to recognise though that civil contingency work is complex. It involves a lot of people, and you're not quite sure which people it's going to involve—that's the other thing. What you need for a flood is different for what you need for, I don't know, an animal health outbreak response. So, you have got to adjust to those circumstances, and every single response is unique. So, even the storms, they're all slightly different. What kind of storm? If you've got a rain dump in one place, is it rain and the sea meeting high tides at the same time? Everything is different, so you just have to respond to what's going on. We've strengthened that strategic oversight and we've reformed also our internal governance to go alongside that. Anything to add, Andy?

Just a couple of points. I think, in terms of the performance metrics and measurable improvements, we were really keen, in developing the delivery plan alongside the resilience framework, that there were some specific objectives there against which we could report in terms of, 'Are we delivering those objectives? Are we delivering the outcomes that we developed in partnership with the responder community?' In the framework, there is a commitment to report annually. First Minister, you provided that first annual statement last summer. So, there will be a regular reporting rhythm around that. I think, on top of that, in terms of that demonstration of meaningful outcomes, is the effectiveness of the response, both at the strategic level and the multi-agency level, and I think there are some specific examples. So, for example, the storms that the First Minister referred to towards the end of 2024. We had storm Burt, then followed closely, after a couple of weeks, by storm Darragh. We could see, just in that short amount of time, there were some discrete bits of learning from the co-ordination of information between those two major incidents that helped to improve the swiftness and agility of how responders got together, co-ordinated information, and provided that response on the ground.

In addition to that, we had two major outages of mains water last year, Conwy and then, later in the year, Flintshire. We could see a material change in how the water companies and utilities worked together and learnt the lessons about how they could provide alternative water supplies to communities between those two events within the space of probably around nine months. So, this point around continuous learning we are seeing coming through in the effectiveness of the response, and that is being borne out in the debriefs to which the First Minister referred.

Okay, thank you. In your written evidence, you state that you support the principle of independent scrutiny. As the Welsh Government has chosen not to support the creation of a UK-wide independent statutory body for whole-system, civil-emergency preparedness and resilience, and will instead rely on UK-level scrutiny mechanisms and expert panels convened by the UK Resilience Academy, how are you ensuring that Wales's own civil contingencies arrangements are subject to independent scrutiny and that Welsh preparedness is not overly reliant on UK-led structures and oversight?

Thanks. I think it's really important to clarify the situation in relation to one of the recommendations of the inquiry. Neither the Welsh Government nor the UK Government or other devolved Governments accepted the proposal for an independent statutory body. I think that is really important, because we didn't want to divert vital resources from our capabilities to prepare and respond to crisis. What you don't want is a whole lot of redundant resources sitting there, just in case. That was something that everybody across the UK in terms of Governments accepted.

Just to be clear, we absolutely value external scrutiny. I think it's really important. One of the lessons I think that came out clearly from the COVID inquiry is that you need a whole load of people testing your assumptions. We've seen that very clearly come out of the inquiry. So, what we're doing, for example, is we've developed this risk register, and one of the things we've done with the risk register is to say, 'Come on, have a look.' What we did is we got the UK Resilience Academy to come and tell us, 'Are we kind of on the right track? Does this make sense?' It wasn't from within Wales that that was looked at. We got these external experts. I think that's really important. We need someone else objective to be marking our homework. We're also clear that emergencies don't respect borders. We've seen that time and time again. So, we're absolutely committed to developing these independent scrutiny mechanisms. I think we're very keen to do that. Just to go back to that point that, for me, I think it's really important also that this annual statement to the Senedd happens in relation to civil contingencies, risks and resilience. I did that earlier last year. I host this annual Cabinet meeting, but I've also been clear that, every four years, there will be a state-of-resilience report—recognising that things change, circumstances change, technology changes, risk changes. I think it's important to keep people abreast of those changes.

Finally, you started this session today by saying how difficult and complicated the COVID-19 pandemic response was for the Welsh Government. I think it would have been difficult for every Government in the world, and no Government will have got every decision correct.

Now, it would be remiss of me not to ask you, in a section about governance and accountability, about the Welsh Government's approach to scrutiny of its actions during the pandemic. You and your two immediate predecessors did not think it was appropriate for Wales to hold its own independent UK COVID inquiry to judge its actions and to get things better for next time. Given how this has played out so far, both in terms of the UK inquiry, where we've seen fewer slots for Welsh Government Ministers, for example, compared to UK Government Ministers, fewer sessions, and the education Minister being unable to attend the most recent session, for example, and then the scrutiny here in the Senedd, which has amounted to about five meetings of this committee, with no further module scheduled to be assessed in any detail by the Senedd in the future, does it remain the Welsh Government's position that the scrutiny afforded to its actions during the pandemic is sufficient?

It is absolutely the same position. I just want to make it clear that, as a Government, we could not have put more effort into responding to the UK inquiry. What has come out absolutely clearly, particularly from the module 2 report, is that, actually, the interconnection between what was happening in Wales and the rest of the UK was absolutely entwined. So, to have a stand-alone inquiry is something that I think wouldn't take account of how those interactions pleated together. But all of that has come out in the inquiry itself. And let's be clear, we're still not even halfway through this inquiry; we've still got a long, long way to go. We've only had module 1 and module 2, and there's a whole load more scrutiny to come, a whole load more analysis to be taken on board.

But what I can tell you is that the findings that they have made, we've responded to. We were ahead of the game when it came to module 1. By the time they came out with their recommendations, all of the stuff that Andy's been talking about this morning was all in train. It was all happening already, because we recognised we needed to tighten things up. So, I don't know, Alyson, if there's anything you'd like to add.

I think you've covered the key points there. The other thing I would say is that the work of the inquiry is not just about the oral evidence. Of course, there are hundreds of written statements the Welsh Government and witnesses have provided to the inquiry, along with thousands and thousands of documents, which, as the First Minister said, the inquiry is analysing. So, there's a huge amount of work that isn't always publicly visible instantly, in the way that the oral evidence sessions are, that is part of the inquiry's work. As the First Minister said, we've just had two reports so far. There are another eight to come. There's more scrutiny happening next month by the inquiry, looking at the impact of the inquiry on society, and the inquiry will have considered all of the work that the Welsh Government has done and shared with it so far as part of that. So, it may not always be visible at the points of oral evidence, but there's a huge amount the inquiry is undertaking in the background as well, which brings it all together.

Just finally, Chair, the Scottish Government has taken a different view on this, and obviously hasn't taken the same decision. Have you spoken to the Scottish Government about why they reached that decision?

I did have a chat with John Swinney about it, and I think they recognise that they've got a huge amount of additional work that they need to do now. You know, you'll have to ask John Swinney how he feels about the situation.

Only last night, I received a further briefing from participants in the UK inquiry—timings, subjects of the modules to come and of reports still to be published—but the concern received during our evidence taking is that several of the modules have not been able to or have not given Wales-specific matters the attention necessary. So, I have been advised—I think we've all been advised—that campaigners are now preparing a new campaign for after the Senedd election, calling for that Wales-specific inquiry, but that's just an observation of fact, so there we are. If I could bring in Adam, please. Adam Price.

Thank you, Chair. I want to turn now to Exercise Pegasus, which you've already mentioned. It's supposed to be a four-nation exercise, which has been jointly designed, jointly led and jointly evaluated. Has that happened in truth, or, rather, was it an exercise that was led by the UK and then with some kind of participation from the devolved Governments?

This exercise was a very realistic one, and as someone who participated in it, and, indeed, everyone in the Cabinet became a part of it, it was actually quite triggering. We were back in that situation that we were in during COVID. We saw people's response. Everyone took it very much seriously.

In terms of preparation, there was co-operation between the four countries to prepare for the exercise, even though, of course, it was the UK National Security Council who led it. But there was a recognition that we needed to work together with the other Governments in the United Kingdom. I think from our perspective, the collaboration was good, in particular in terms of policy, in terms of comms.

We did put a lot of resources into it in terms of planning and the development of the exercise, so that our systems were also tested. So, there was that planning element, and there was a particular team for that, the red team, which was preparing, and then there was the blue team, which related to people who were actually responding. It was really, really comprehensive, and it took place over quite an extended period—it was at least three days—and all kinds of organisations came together and took it seriously. Andy—sorry, Adam.

I'm grateful. Could you give an example, therefore, in terms of planning the exercise itself? That is, could you give us an example of where you had influenced the choice of scenario, or the terms of reference or other elements, for example?

Andy.

Diolch. In terms of influencing the exercise itself, there's a clear demarcation between those players, the blue team, those who were responding to the scenario, and the red team who were involved in the design of the exercise. In terms of the approach there, we had representation on both sides, the red and the blue teams, as it were, and in terms of the preparation, that began at a really early stage. So, early in 2025, we established the Exercise Pegasus co-ordination group that I co-chaired with colleagues from health. That brought together all the major departments across Welsh Government and the local responder community so that they could start preparing for the exercise and that we could feed into that.

Alongside that, there were two specific lead-in exercises, Exercise SOLARIS and Exercise ALKARAB, aimed at, one, Government departments, and the other, in relation to the responder community, again to road test some of the arrangements in advance of the full scenario playing out in three phases during the autumn. So, there was full participation in the process. There was the opportunity through these two exercises and the co-ordination group to take on board points around how this scenario would be developed. That was taken on board by the red team. It also informed the formulation of specific objectives that we wanted to test in Exercise Pegasus.

So, there was an agreed set of objectives that the First Minister and Cabinet endorsed so that we could road test and stress test the plans that we had developed since the pandemic. And to that end, it was a really useful and valuable exercise that is generating significant learning.

And in terms of the blue team, so those who were part of the live exercise, did the blue team in Wales, if I can put it that way, have the same kind of access to data and information as the blue team in Westminster or in Whitehall or wherever would have?

So, in advance of Pegasus, there was a lot of work put into improving data flows, information sharing between departments and partners across Wales and the UK. One of the major advances was the establishment of a memorandum of understanding with the national situation centre. That's housed in Cabinet Office. And that allowed a more free-flowing passing of intelligence and information to inform the response to Pegasus, but also in real-world situations. That was put in place in advance, so that meant that we could have better access to information during Pegasus as we tested our plans.

The other thing to say about the interaction with UK Government colleagues is that part of the response invoked the crisis management machinery within UK Government, the COBRA meetings, chaired by UK Ministers, and that provided a real opportunity for Ministers to engage formally and regularly during that exercise.

And in drawing up the scenario, was one of the things that you were trying to reflect, in order to make it realistic and to reflect things on the ground, as it were, policy divergence between the different Governments?

Can I ask Sioned to come in?

As the Minister and Andy mentioned, there was the red team and the blue team. The red team did the planning work, and that was led by DHSC and UKHSA, but the reason we thought it was very important that we had members as part of the red team was, as you said, to make sure that they understood the policy and the policy context in Wales in that work. So, there were people from the Welsh Government on the team, and someone from PHW was on the red team as well, in order to allow for that and to allow that that information could come through in terms of the blue team work in every nation.

We were also part of the strategic group that had oversight of the work as well in terms of the planning and the decisions made in terms of whether we were ready to go or not. And I think one of the things that has come through in terms of the learning already in terms of evaluating Pegasus was the detailed work that's gone into the scenario. As the First Minister mentioned, it felt like that we were in the pandemic when we were doing this piece of work, and the reason for that was because the scenario was a very, very real scenario, and a very different scenario to COVID, but it was making sure that we could test different elements of our planning and our contingencies for the future.

Very quickly, could I just flag up some of the criticisms that have been made about the blind spots of Exercise Pegasus, if I can put it that way? One relating to compound risks—for example, a pandemic happening at the same time as severe flooding—and the role of social care and the role of the voluntary sector. What is your view on those different themes regarding how, in future exercises, we need to tackle those things?

I think, in terms of things happening concurrently, we have had examples of that. If you remember, before the pandemic, we'd just had major flooding. We were still dealing with the impacts of those. We were still dealing with Brexit. Those things were happening at the same time. So, it's important to recognise that these compound emergencies are things that are constantly tested. That wasn't part of Pegasus, as you said, but that is part of the norm that we take for granted, in a way. I don't accept that care wasn't part of Pegasus. Certainly, that was part of the exercise that we took part in. We were talking about carers and how we dealt with care in the community, how we dealt with care homes, and how we safeguarded vulnerable people. What was different in this case was that children were affected, and that wasn't something that we really saw during COVID in the same way. So, that did bring in a completely new dimension to that, and that was an important element for us to test, I think.

Sorry, Adam, if I may, very briefly, and then I'll bring you back in, I think the evidence we've heard stated that Pegasus focused on the health elements of everything, including the areas that you referred to, but not on the wider social care and other matters that would need to be incorporated in any co-ordinated approach.

Well, we certainly did in Wales. We incorporated social care challenges, as I say, and we did have consideration for the care sector workforce, resilience, management of care homes, whilst we responded to and engaged with these issues during the exercise, for example, by advising care homes and adjusting policies for vulnerable groups, rather than focusing on health systems alone. So, I would not accept that that wasn't something that we considered during our part of the exercise in Wales in relation to Pegasus.

I would just comment that I know—because I got scores of e-mails at the time because of the roles I have in relation to, particularly, people with additional learning needs or people on the autism spectrum et cetera—that it was very much reactive rather than proactive planning, but there isn't time to go into that now. But I think these are the sorts of areas that were found to be wanting at the time and would need to be incorporated into future planning.

Can I ask Sioned to come in there?

I think our planning for preparedness is very much a cross-Government approach, and that's something that we wanted to test during the exercise as well. So, we moved very much to a cross-Government approach, because of the nature of pandemics and the impact they have on different groups in society. And the exercise did test Ministers with regard to really difficult decisions, especially with regard to school closures and lockdown decisions as well, as part of that exercise, as we moved through the phases.

I think the nature of an exercise—. Even though this was a very significant exercise over a number of weeks, with three anchor days, very different to the way we've done tier 1 exercises in the past, I think there are areas that we weren't able to test. And the nature of the exercise as well didn't allow us to do some of that policy development and engagement that we would want to do with regard to some groups as well. So, I think there are areas around that that the exercise didn't allow us to test, and those are things that we are capturing, in order that we can test them in different ways going forward to support that planning preparedness, including working with a wider number of groups.

Adam, please.

We've had some evidence that has suggested that we need to strengthen the mechanism for learning lessons from the multi-agency exercises across Government. And one of the suggestions is that we do something similar to what's happened in Scotland with SMARTEU, or however they pronounce it, namely creating some kind of multi-agency national unit for resilience training and exercises. Are you interested in and do you agree with that idea?

We have already commissioned work on this. So, this was something that those category 1 responders raised, that we needed a central repository where everyone could access the information that they needed. And therefore, we have commissioned the UK Resilience Academy to work with the Wales Resilience Partnership to implement a mechanism to do that. So, yes, certainly, we are learning lessons from that.

Anything to add to that, Andy?

Yes, First Minister. Just to add that we are working with Scottish Government colleagues to learn from some of their experience, amongst other partners as well. This component is actually a specific element of the Wales resilience framework delivery plan. We've made that commitment to develop that capability, and that forms part of a wider capability programme to drive up resilience. And it's a cornerstone of what we're doing, that continuous improvement commitment, to learn the lessons, to lock in the lessons, not only to change actions in the short term but to review those, because circumstances change, the risks change and, alongside that, the response capabilities need to change with it. So, we're trying to build into that process that continuous improvement so that we can build our capability looking ahead, and match that evolution of risk that we will undoubtedly see.

Finally from me, Chair, the UK COVID inquiry, in its module 1 report, does suggest that we need to publish reports on exercises by all of the Governments within three months, and an action plan then within six months, and that they are all kept within the UK archive. Where are you at in terms of meeting those targets?

Andy.

In terms of that specific recommendation, we accept that. Transparency and openness is a cornerstone of what we're doing with the resilience framework. In terms of Exercise Pegasus, it is ongoing. So, the exercise hasn't actually finished yet, that's continuing during this year, and the intention is that we will move to a position, pending Ministers' views, for publishing a report on what worked well, what lessons did we pick up through that exercise, once the exercise has finished. We won't be limiting our approach here to Exercise Pegasus. With any major exercise that will be coming down the track, we will take a similar approach so that Ministers can consider publishing that information about the learning. So, that is something that is forming, very much, part of our work programme.

Are all of the Governments taking the same approach in terms of Exercise Pegasus, or have some of them published reports already?

It hasn't finished yet. That's what Andy was saying. So—

Yes, but is there—

No, we're working together on the evaluation work of Pegasus. So, there is work happening on a four-nations level, and we are doing additional work in terms of Wales as well, which will work jointly in terms of the work that's going on at the four-nations level. That work will be happening.

There is another element of Pegasus that's still to come, the recovery element, and that's going to happen in the spring, and that will then add to the evaluation work that we'll be doing over the next months.

And there are no interim reports in terms of the different phases during Pegasus. You're waiting right until the end.

So, there are elements where we think—. There are lessons we've already learned from Pegasus and we're very keen to move that work forward in terms of the Welsh element. So, there are early lessons that we're going to look into. Andy and I were talking about it this morning, about the work that we're doing in that area.

An example of that is the central repository. We've learned from that. We're not waiting until we've written a report; we have commissioned that piece of work already, even though the exercise hasn't been completed yet.

Okay. Rhianon Passmore, please.

Diolch, Chair. Thank you for your commentary so far. In regard to the updating of the current risk register, how have you identified and assessed the vulnerable groups—and there are many across Wales—within the current document? I'm presuming from what has been said that it's a live document. And, as a supplementary, when is it next going to be updated, taking into account the impact on vulnerable groups?

We've taken really decisive steps to improve that risk assessment and strategic planning. You'll be aware that we have got, now, that bespoke classified risk register for Wales. I think we're the first in the United Kingdom to do that, and that's been set out. That's been developed with the four local resilience forum groups, so that they're telling us, 'In this particular area, this is a risk. You need to be watching out for that.' Of course, that's going to be continually updated. And that includes the impact on vulnerable people. I think the important thing to note is that, actually, during a crisis, who the vulnerable are may change, so vulnerability is not a fixed trait. It's something that can change according to circumstances. So, those emergencies, quite often, introduce new vulnerabilities. So, you've got to be on your toes in terms of responding. There is a UK-wide risk group, and the Welsh Government liaises with that, and there is guidance issued by the UK Government, and that's drawn up from experts in the field. So, all of that is being fed into who we consider to be vulnerable now, but it's a moving feast. We have to recognise that all of this needs to be constantly updated and reviewed.

So, it's a live document. So, when I ask a question around when is it going to be updated next, would you be able to answer that, or is it continually—?

That it's always being updated is the point.

The first Wales risk register was approved at the back end of 2024. During this year, that whole risk register will be updated. I think the important point to make here is that it's a classified risk register, but there's also work that we're taking forward alongside that to produce more robust information for the public in relation to the risks that we face in Wales. There's quite a lot of information out there. The UK Government have produced a national risk register for the public, and there are also the local resilience forum community risk registers. One of their core duties is to produce that local level community risk register, and we are really keen to make sure that, when LRFs are producing those risk registers, they capture the impacts on those with vulnerabilities. So, we are working actively with them, drawing on new data capabilities to help address some of these issues.

Sorry to interrupt, but in regard to identification of the dynamic vulnerable group category, are we using all of our data to do that, or are we just relying on the local resilience forums, or both?

We are drawing on the local knowledge from the responder community, but we're also looking at some of the large data sets. I talked earlier about the national situation centre. There's some really useful intelligence and information that we can draw on to bring together, from the UK level right down to the local level, to help identify that need.

I think it would be useful to update this committee, Chair, I think, when the local resilience forums are publishing their local risk registers, and when we next formally update, even though it's not public, the risk register that you said.

I'm going to move on. In regard to equality impact assessments, for many across the public sector and beyond it's often a tick-box exercise. In regard to this and the importance of it, you've mentioned that it will be part and parcel of the equality impact assessment around the specific improvements. How are you ensuring compliance in that regard and that it isn't a tick-box exercise in terms of drawing those together in this field?

We don't take equality in the Welsh Government as a tick-box exercise.

I'm very pleased to hear that.

This is something that is absolutely fundamental to our core beliefs as a Government. The fact that we have created not just a disability framework for the future, but also an anti-racism plan—. These are the absolute core values of this Government, so it will never be a tick-box exercise for us.

We have incorporated an equality impact assessment into our situation updates, which we issue for certain categories of incident. And as I said earlier, we've got this concept of operations—so, when does it kick in, and in what circumstances do we say, 'Right, this is serious' and you kick it up? Obviously, there are things that are serious, but then there are catastrophic things. On all of those lines, we consider equalities and there's an equality cell in our response structures. So, it's not a tick-box exercise, because there are people actually sitting there making sure we take this extremely seriously. And I just want to reassure you—

Good.

—that we do take it very seriously. It’s one of the five harms. We had four harms, and we in the Welsh Government added a fifth, which is about equality. And that is fundamentally how we respond now—how equality is core to our response.

Thank you for underscoring that. In regard, then, to the evidence from Race Council Cymru that was given to this committee—and the learnings are ongoing, as we’ve spoken of previously, and we’ve talked about data sets that were missing originally—what initiatives have been implemented in terms of reaching out to black and ethnic minority organisations, so that we can actually work with communities and gain that best information to populate our data?

So, all of this was flagged up during work on the 'Anti-racist Wales Action Plan'. We were incredibly sensitised, I think, during the course of the pandemic on the disproportionate impact it was having on black and ethnic minority communities. And, during the pandemic, we ran at that situation and tried to do what we could during the pandemic. We’re trying to get ahead of that now, and we do have now this enhanced workforce data across health and social care, through that workforce race equality standard. And the whole point of that is that you’ve got information that is routinely collated and shared, and used transparently to level those inequalities in health.

The important thing is to collect the data. And it’s really fascinating—I had a very interesting conversation with colleagues in France about how they assess equality, and it’s actually very different from the way we assess it. They say that you can’t collect data about different communities—ethnic communities—because that isn’t equality, acting in an equal way, whereas, actually, if you don’t collect the data, how the hell do you know? So, it’s a really different cultural approach to how you run at this issue. And we’re very clear that you can’t know what’s happening unless you collect the data.

Absolutely. And in terms of the evidence from Race Council Cymru, they did say that they hadn’t been contacted. Is that in play, or are there plans to do that, in terms of their ability to also disseminate information?

As I mentioned earlier, we will be engaging with all kinds of wider communities. So, that—

But they're a key organisation for Wales in this group.

They are a key organisation that we will be engaging with, yes. We did engage, as part of our inequalities cell, and also the work preparing for Pegasus, with the Wales Council for Voluntary Action, who are kind of the umbrella organisation. But we recognise that there's further work, further engagement that we want to do with others as well.

Okay.

If I could just add to that as well, I think one of our commitments in the Wales resilience framework is to develop a community resilience strategy. And I think there are some really good opportunities through that work stream to engage with colleagues from that side as well.

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you. And I would add to that that bodies, including Race Council Cymru, told us they have not been contacted about resilience planning since the pandemic. Do you therefore recognise, as they emphasise, the ability of bodies such as Race Council Cymru to reach communities that statutory agencies struggle to engage, and that, without that data, you'll have an incomplete picture?

So, this is all part of the 'Anti-racist Wales Action Plan'. That's the point—it's there now. Collecting that data is fundamental to what we're trying to achieve. Obviously, that will feed into what we do in a contingency space. But, also, I think what's important is to recognise that, actually, the best way to get to those communities is not at a national level, but at a local level. It's the local fora that are best able to feed to us how we best engage with those areas. So, that's already being done, to an extent. So, it may be that it's happening at a sub-national level rather than a national level.

Would it be possible to update this committee in terms of the progress in that area, please?

Yes, we can write to you on that.

Thank you.

And also note that it's not just Race Council Cymru; it's all protected characteristics, and any other groups who are best reached by non-statutory agencies, for all sorts of reasons, whether that's learning need, learning disability, culture, language, faith or otherwise. Thank you. I'll bring in, therefore, Mike Hedges, please.

Thank you very much, Chair.

I've got questions on data. The first one is that, given the new Welsh emergency care data set and replacement for the Tarian system will not be completed until autumn 2026, is that still the date it's expected to be completed? When it starts, will parallel running occur? And the third question on this is: what happens in the meantime if something goes wrong?

Mike, that's the very question I've been asking. It's all very well to plan for the future; we could have an emergency tomorrow. What do we do? What's in place? So, just in terms of the future, we have now put some significant funding in to make sure that we have those data sets. So, £2.29 million has been awarded to Public Health Wales to transform that core health protection digital system so that it could manage major incidents. And the kind of mass contact tracing, which you'll remember, in places like—where was it—Singapore or South Korea, it was all up and running, they had it all—. We're still not quite in that place, but we're trying to get to that place so that if it happened again—. And don't forget, technology is moving on every minute, so you do have to just keep on updating these things. So, the full business case for that was submitted at the end of October and a supplier has been awarded. The existing Tarian system does have the capacity to support most activities required in a pandemic already, but on a smaller scale. So, we've got something; it wouldn't cover everything. Andy, is there anything to add to that?

No.

On Tarian, can I just—? So, Tarian is a significant system for us on health protection, managing incidents and outbreaks. So, in peacetime, it's a really important system for us. What it hasn't been able to do and what it couldn't do during COVID was kind of scale up at the level that we needed to and engage it. So, it's kind of utilised by Public Health Wales—there have been licences to other partners, but this is about scaling up. So, if there was, as we're working—. It's a really exciting project for us and a big development for us from a health protection perspective, but in the interim, if something did happen, we would have to develop a separate customer relationship management system to provide that scale-up if we needed it, and we're in discussion with Digital Health and Care Wales on how we would do that if we needed something in the interim.

I had three questions in one go, but I'll ask them now separately. Will it be available in the autumn?

That's the plan and that's what we're working to.

And the other one is, when it starts up—and Horizon is the big one people talk about, but it's not abnormal for a new computer system to have problems with it—are you going to engage in parallel running to ensure that Tarian is producing the same results as the new system, albeit on a smaller scale?

We'll be testing and developing this, and we will have that kind of back-up plan with regard to when we introduce the new system.

I'll try again. Are you going to have parallel running when you start the new system?

There will be an element of parallel running, but there's also work that we're doing around phasing it as well, so that we are testing it as we are developing the new system.

I think that may be partly—. If I try and translate the answer you gave me to the question I asked, is the answer 'partly'?

Partly.

Thank you. Now, moving on further on data, the Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust described the current legislative landscape for data sharing as a minefield. I've got comments on that. We also heard how, during recent flooding, the Monmouthshire statutory agencies were not able to share the details of vulnerable people with the British Red Cross, preventing them from providing aid. What is going to be done about it? Everybody hides behind general data protection regulations, but you can give permission. As you know, Chair, we contact the health boards fairly regularly on behalf of constituents and we've got this form that they fill in and say they give us permission to have that information. Are you intending to allow organisations such as the Red Cross, with vulnerable people who are registered with the local council, to tick a box, saying, 'Yes, you can share my data with the British Red Cross or any other organisations you think would be beneficial'? And if there's a problem with the ambulance service sharing data with other public bodies, that's a public body problem and they need to get agreement that they will share data.

Thanks. We can't ignore the legal frameworks that exist. There are certain legal requirements that we have to respect, and protection of people's personal information is a part of that legal requirement. But you're quite right, there are exceptions, and that is why, through the Wales resilience partnership, we've set up now a new task and finish group to bring together those responders, the third sector people you're talking about, the utilities companies. Because we recognised, actually, there's a hell of a lot of people out there with a lot of data that is not being cross-tested. We've seen this during the storms in particular. Utilities have a list of vulnerable customers, we've got GPs who have a list of vulnerable people they work with. That task and finish group will bring together all of those things to consider data-sharing issues and, obviously, the Welsh Government will be a part of that.

But the key data-sharing issue is people giving permission. When I share my data with my GP, I've given my GP permission to have it and share it within a health context. I haven't given my GP permission to share it with anybody else, because my GP hasn't asked me to. If my GP asked me, 'Could I share this data with some other organisation?' I'd check the organisations and I'd tick or cross the ones that I was happy with. I'm not sure why that system can't be in operation. I have, I'm sure you do as well, constituents contacting me with health problems, and when you go to the health board, you have a form—. They must have lots of people sending them in, because they've got a standard form for you to fill in, saying they give permission for information to be provided to you. It's just why we can't have that sort of thing in the system.

That's precisely what I would expect to come from this task and finish group. Andy, do you have anything to add?

I think it's a really important area the Member has raised here, which is why we've got this specific task and finish group to look at it. I would say, however, there is existing Government guidance in relation to the responder community to manage data and share information, and they have a duty to do so. The Information Commissioner has also issued specific advice in relation to this. In a life-and-death situation where there's risk to life, in emergencies, responders can share information to that end. So, we're going to be working with the responder community to make sure that we sharpen those arrangements and, as the First Minister pointed out, put in place that new capability so there's new information that responders have to grapple with incidents when they occur.

I agree with you entirely, but I think that there's nervousness on behalf of organisations, and they use GDPR as a means to protect themselves.

It's really interesting, I went to visit the National Grid call centre, and I listened in to a conversation there, and it was really striking to me that they were calling up vulnerable customers, and they specifically asked, 'Would you be prepared for us to share your data?' So, some are doing it; I guess what we're looking for is consistency, so that we can get everybody sharing. Having this task and finish group means that you can have those utilities, for example, asking the same questions, so that there's a common approach. That's where I'd imagine it would go, but that's the purpose of the task and finish group.

Okay. Thank you.

Thank you. As we heard, for example, this prevented the British Red Cross from providing aid. But I remember 20 years ago, we were wrestling the situation where emergency service call centres, or proposed call centres, were being challenged on the basis—or they were saying—there were problems with integration because of shared data or sharing data barriers. A solution was found. So, it's question of if there's a will, there's a way.

But moving on to further questions around the voluntary sector, we heard repeated concerns from voluntary organisations that they're often only consulted after decisions are made and that none were invited to contribute to Wales's bespoke civil contingencies risk register, which means it's full of blind spots. How will you therefore ensure that voluntary organisations are embedded as genuine planning partners from the outset—reflecting some of the comments on earlier questions about some of the groups we referred to where statutory agencies will not always be able to communicate as well with those groups—rather than being brought in after the fact?

I'll give you some examples of where we've been trying to make sure that that is not the case—that the voluntary sector in particular is aligned and works with us right from the beginning. That classified risk register, which Andy talked about, is the only risk register that has been developed with input from local resilience forum partners. Of course, there are representatives from voluntary organisations on those local resilience committees. Another example is that the voluntary sector were invited to attend the Wales civil contingencies committee meetings, which were activated during the Pegasus exercise. So, those are a couple of examples. I don't know if you'd like to add to that.

It's just worth saying that we are looking to ensure that they can have access to ResilienceDirect, which is a secure platform for sharing information between responders. Because these people run at emergencies. There are people who run away and there are organisations, in particular in parts of our communities, in the voluntary sector, who run at situations. These are the heroes of our society, the heroes of our community, and of course we need to support them and stand by them and give them the information that they need. Andy.

I would just say that, from a working-level perspective, we really value the input from the third sector and voluntary organisations in our arrangements. As the First Minister pointed out, they are represented on the Wales resilience partnership. The Wales risk register that I talked to was presented and endorsed by that partnership. I'm a little disappointed to hear the comments and the evidence that's been presented for you. I think maybe that suggests we need to do more. We can talk to our colleagues who are represented on that group across the third sector and we can build on the input that they've already made.

I think the other thing to say is that, First Minister, you referred to Exercise Pegasus; that is an integral component to our crisis management arrangements. Our aim here is to make sure that, through platforms such as ResilienceDirect, the right information can get to those organisations so that they can respond swiftly in emergencies, but we've got clear planning in place for them to do that.

All too often, we hear from voluntary bodies that representation on things like local resilience forums or regional partnership boards is tokenistic. I think the issue is that many of these bodies are providing 24/7 key services in the community, and only they will have that data. So, it's important that that's in at the beginning, not brought in after the fact. I think that's the key point they're trying to raise. For example, the Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust referred to the importance of creating a central repository of volunteers and integrating volunteer capacity into local resilience forum planning. What consideration have you given to developing a Wales-wide system to map, co-ordinate and activate volunteer resources during emergencies?

We have provided them with financial support to develop Volunteering Wales, which is a free-to-access online platform, which is based on what we learnt during the pandemic. Andy, is there anything to add to that?

I think that there is more work to be done in this space. We have provided that financial support. I think we perhaps need to clarify some of the remit and objectives in this space, and we will take that forward through the partnership.

I was just going to add on that, because I worked with the third sector a lot during the pandemic. One of the distinguishing features, I think, for us in our pandemic response, which was there at the time, was the third sector structure that we have in Wales, and we have had for a long time the Volunteering Wales platform. What we identified early on is we needed to strengthen it, so we invested early on in the pandemic. Of course, as you have heard, there are even further opportunities to do that through the learning, as you've talked about through the session, First Minister—hence the most recent funding that's gone into it. So, it's one of those things—a bit like you were talking about in terms of equality earlier—that's the cornerstone of Government; I think engagement with the third sector is another. So, the use of that structure during the pandemic itself in response, I think, was very strong, and as you say, some of that then leading into planning is an important aspect of the entire civil contingency system.

Thank you. Developing the theme further, the Wales Council for Voluntary Action told us there is currently no standing mechanism that allows the Welsh Government to use trusted voluntary partners to distribute emergency funding quickly when emergencies or crises arise. What consideration, if any, have you therefore given to establishing a permanent mechanism, such as a pre-agreed grant or framework, to enable rapid funding through the voluntary sector in future emergencies? I know I at the time, and I'm sure colleagues who were also MSs at the time, was approached by many third sector bodies delivering key services in a whole variety of areas, who initially saw a huge surge in demand that they were unable to resource, or they resourced by dipping into reserves, which was unsustainable.

I think it's probably worth setting out that we do have an emergency financial assistance scheme, but this is activated and paid via local authorities. I suppose whilst no mechanism exists in relation to the voluntary sector, we have been able to provide emergency funding to county voluntary councils. For example, during storm Darragh, when we had flooding in west Wales, we were able to provide some funding. I think we're open to exploring how that mechanism could be simplified and used in a more timely way. If you have to be moved out of your home and you don't have any money, you may need some emergency resources. I can see that there may be an occasion when, actually, just giving it directly to voluntary services who are on the ground might be quicker than going via local authorities who are still involved in the action itself, in resolving the problem itself. So, that is something we're open to exploring.

There's also the third sector bodies that have national representation. I know at the time, at their request, I made representations to the Welsh Government for bodies ranging from Welsh Women's Aid to Hourglass on older people's abuse, which went up massively during the pandemic, and many others besides, who went through those weeks and months of crisis before things were able to stabilise.

We've got mechanisms like the discretionary assistance fund and things, haven't we? So, it's not like there's nothing in place. There's lots that exist already. But I guess it's recognising that during an emergency situation, you might need to run into that situation and maybe earmark some money around the DAF, or whatever. So, I think we're open to exploring opportunities and possibilities around that.

I think the strong relationships that exist in Wales that we hear about a lot between Government and partners is something that is a strength that we bring to emergency response as well. We certainly saw that in the pandemic. If you think about the third sector and the WCVA, by the end of March 2020, we'd agreed a scheme for funding support for the third sector, working closely with WCVA and then other partners through the CVCs to distribute money across Wales, including hyperlocal, the really small groups that just popped up. So, that partnership working, I think, is a real strength that we bring to emergency planning and response here.

In the last minute, a final question, therefore. We heard that voluntary organisations can act as trusted messengers during emergencies, with strong reach into hard-to-engage groups, such as those we've discussed, and proven communication networks from the pandemic. Will the Welsh Government therefore ensure that trusted community networks are formally integrated into future emergency communications and public messaging strategies, and if so, how?

I think we recognise that sometimes Government is not the best vehicle to convey messages to certain groups, and that they need people from within their own trusted communities to do that, and that's why building a relationship and a rapport with them is absolutely critical. I think this worked really well during the pandemic with, for example, Muslim Doctors Cymru, who were really, really active in getting the Muslim community to take up the vaccination rates and things. It was much, much better coming from them than coming from a politician. They were just more comfortable with the message coming from there.

We all saw misinformation around in relation to the vaccine. Some of that's still around. It is important that we counteract that, but getting trusted voices to counteract it is important. The WCVA and the Red Cross were both represented on the Wales warning and informing group, and that met daily during most the most acute phase of the pandemic, and that was chaired by the Welsh Government. So, I think we're doing some, but obviously there are always opportunities to do a bit more, identify people, but also recognise that people come and go, so you have to keep all of that information updated as well.

That brings our questions today to a conclusion. A transcript of today's proceedings will be shared with you for you to check for accuracy before publication. So it just falls for me to again thank you for being with us today and for giving evidence.

Members, I propose now that in accordance with Standing Order 17.42(ix), the committee resolves to meet in private for the remainder of the meeting. Are Members content? Thank you. I note Members are content, so if we could go into private session, please.